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Abstract
This paper attempts to estimate the causal effect of public capital stock on
production using Japanese prefectural data. We first articulate the difficulty
of consistently estimating the regional-level production function with pub-
lic capital due to the endogeneity of the public capital stock amount. As
the central government allocates most of the public capital across regions in
Japan, the stock amount of public capital could be endogenous because it
could be allocated to either booming regions to support private activity or to
stagnating regions to help them become more productive. The endogeneity
of public capital is more serious when local governments make decisions re-
garding public capital investments, as in the US, because such decisions are
directly affected by local governments’ budgetary constraints.
We need an exogenous variation of public capital investment across re-
gions in order to estimate the causal effect of public capital on production.
Japan’s electoral reform in 1994 offers an exogenous variation of this sort.
The reform drastically changed the distribution of political representation in
the Lower House across regions, and it accordingly changed the allocation
of public capital across regions as well. The productivity of public capital
based on this natural experimental identification strategy indicates higher
productivity due to public capital than indicated by the OLS estimation.
JEL Classification: C25
Key Words: Public Capital, Productivity, Political Economy, Instrumental
Variable Estimation. 
1 Introduction
Estimates of the productivity of public capital, such as highway, port, water,
and sewer systems, are crucial in public policy debates. As of fiscal year 1996
in Japan, about 8 trillion yen has been spent on public investment annually,
while the total government budget has been about 82 trillion yen and the
GNP has been about 500 trillion. Whether this expenditure can be justified
heavily depends on the estimated productivity of public capital.
To facilitate public policy debates, economists have attempted to estimate
the productivity of public capital. For example, Aschauer (1989), Munnell
(1990), Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992), Holz-Eakin (1994), Evans and Kar-
ras (1994), and Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and Porter (1996) have attempted
to estimate the public capital productivity for the US. Mera (1973), Asako,
Tsuneki, Fukuda, Teruyama, Tsukamoto, and Sugiura (1994), The Economic
Planning Agency (1997), Iwamoto, Ouchi, Takeshita, and Bessho (1996), and
Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) did the same for Japan. Identifying the causal
effect of public capital on national or regional production is difficult, how-
ever, because the invested amount in public capital is not randomly decided
and is likely to be correlated with a nation’s or region’s economic condition.
Thus, the stock amount of public capital is most likely to be endogenous
in the production function. Previous studies have attempted to deal with
this endogeneity using panel data, but not much variation in public capital
stock remains after partialing out the regional and time fixed effects, and
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this small, remaining variation makes a precise inference very difficult.
The purpose of this study is to identify the causal effect of public capital
stock on production, using a recent electoral reform in Japan as a natural ex-
periment that created an exogenous variation of public capital across regions.
The drastic electoral reform of Japan in 1994 changed the regional alloca-
tion of both political influence and public capital drastically. We exploit
this exogenous change in public capital allocation to estimate the produc-
tivity of public capital. The estimation results indicate that public capital
is modestly productive and suggests a possible downward bias in the OLS
estimation that does not consider the endogeneity of the public capital allo-
cation. A reliable instrumental variable fixed effects estimation is hampered
by possible measurement errors in input amounts.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
existing literature and introduces the Japanese political economy of public
capital allocation and the 1994 electoral reform, and its effect on public
capital allocation. Section 3 discusses the empirical methodology, and section
4 describes the data. Section 5 reports the estimation results, and section 6
discusses the results’ robustness. The last section concludes.
2 Background
2.1 The Existing Literature
The estimation of the marginal productivity of public capital in the US was
spurred by Aschauer (1989)’s work, which pointed out that lower produc-
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tivity growth in the US during the 1970s is mostly explained by reduced
investment in public capital during that period. Munnell (1990) also re-
ported similar findings. Their studies both were based on macro time-series,
and some economists criticized their findings, pointing to the possible endo-
geneity of public capital because the public capital investment could have
been hampered by low tax revenue due in the stagnated economy during
the 1970s. Garcia-Mila and McGuire (1992) also found a significant effect
of public capital on states’ output based on state-level panel data. However,
Holz-Eakin (1994) and Evans and Karras (1994) cast doubt on the results
because such data do not allow for state fixed effects. After allowing for
state fixed effects, they did not find any significant effect of states’ public
capital on states’ output. Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and Porter (1996) also pro-
vided a skeptical view on the causal relationship between public capital stock
and production, applying a fixed effects estimation on the first-differenced
data using state panel data. Studies have indicated that allowing for state
fixed effects is important because those states with persistently high levels of
production are more likely to hold higher levels of public capital. This is a
natural consequence of the fact that state-level public capital is likely to be
financed through states’ tax revenue in the US. Due to this local government
budget constraint, the OLS estimates are likely to suffer from an upward
bias. After a decade-long dispute, US economists seem to have reached an
agreement that the state public capital does not positively affect state pro-
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duction.1 However, it should be noted that there is not much variation in
labor, private capital, and public capital input after state and year fixed
effects are partialed out (Ai and Cassou (1997)).2.
The estimation of the production function with public capital has at-
tracted economists’ interest for a longer time in Japan than in the US, prob-
ably because public capital is centrally allocated by the national government
and the allocation of public capital had been used as a crucial policy instru-
ment to attain “balanced growth” across regions. Mera (1973) estimated the
regional production function that includes labor, capital, as well as public
capital, as inputs. Since his classic work, numerous studies have attempted
to estimate the causal effect of public capital stock on production using pre-
fectural data (Asako, Tsuneki, Fukuda, Teruyama, Tsukamoto, and Sugiura
(1994), Mitsui and Ohta (1995), The Economic Planning Agency (1997)).
For example, Yamano and Ohkawara (2000) estimated the production func-
tion with prefecture fixed effects without year fixed effects, and the elasticity
of public capital on production was estimated to be 0.15 with statistical sig-
nificance. However, in our calculation with prefecture and year fixed effects
based on their data, the significantly positive effect disappears.3 The regres-
1Some studies have paid attention to the fact that public capital could affect different
sectors in different ways. See Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) for theory and evidence and
Chandra and Thompson (2000) for the effect of the interstate highway system on the
different sectors of a regional economy.
2Ai and Cassou (1997) regressed public capital stock on state and year dummies and
obtained R2 = 0.996 using Holz-Eakin (1994)’s data. They found similar results for the
data of Evans and Karras (1994).
3We thank Norihiko Yamano and Toru Ohkawara for providing us with their data.
4
sion of public capital on time and prefecture dummies renders R2 = 0.994.
This fact by no means implies that Yamano and Ohkawara (2000)’s conclu-
sion was wrong, but it is worth noting that once both year and prefecture
fixed effects are taken into account, empirical studies using Japanese data
also suffer from the multicolinearity between public capital and state and
year dummies, as articulated by Ai and Cassou (1997).
The above literature review shows the typical robustness-efficiency trade
off that empirical economists face. Researchers can deal with the correlation
between state (prefecture) unobserved heterogeneity and the stock level of
public capital by using a fixed effects estimation; however, the variation of
public capital within a state over time is small. Accordingly, the fixed effects
estimation tends to render imprecise estimates. Thus, to execute a precise
estimation, it is necessary to exploit the variation of public capital across
regions due to the exogenous shock by the instrumental variable estimation.
2.2 The Political Economy of Public Capital Alloca-
tion in Japan and the 1994 Electoral Reform
The electoral reform of Japan in 1994 offers an ideal ground to obtain across-
prefecture exogenous variations of public capital. The electoral reform caused
a drastic change in the distribution of each prefecture’s political representa-
tion in the House of Representatives (Lower House), and, accordingly, it
changed the allocation of public capital investment across prefectures due to
pork-barrel politics, as already pointed out by Horiuchi and Saito (2003) in
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the form of the allocation of subsidies from the central government to local
governments. Because subsidies often are tied to public capital investment,
we can expect that the electoral reform created an exogeneous variation of
public capital amounts across prefectures. We use this exogeneous variation
as an instrumental variable to identify the causal effect of public capital on
prefecture production.
In Japan, the central government provides most of the funds for public
capital and allocates it across regions. Although government bureaucrats
draft the fiscal budget plan, politics are involved in the public capital allo-
cation decision-making process.4 Okuno (1988), Okuno, Yakita, and Yagi
(1994) and Yoshino and Yoshida (1988) have shown that the central govern-
ment mostly has allocated the public capital to rural, less developed areas
in order to attain the goal of “balanced growth” across regions after the mid
1960s. One major reason why rural areas have attracted more public capital
investment per capita than urban areas is the malapportionment of electoral
districts in Japan. Under the electoral system that was used before the 1994
reform, the number of the seats in the House of Representatives based on the
population had been higher in rural areas because the seat allocation had
been relatively fixed while Japan experienced urbanization after World War
II.5 Yoshino and Yoshida (1988) showed that the number of seats per popu-
4For a description of the process of how the Japanese government drafts the fiscal bud-
get plan, see Ishi (1996). For evidence of political intervention in the budget’s allocation,
see Meyer and Naka (1998).
5See Horiuchi and Saito (2003) for evidence.
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lation positively affected the amount of public capital intended for industrial
purposes that each region received. Meyer and Naka (1999) showed that the
per capita representation of each prefecture determines the amount of sub-
sidy transfer from the central government to the local government. Horiuchi
and Saito (2003) used the more detailed municipal data to show the positive
and significant relationship between the seats per capita and the amount of
subsidy transfer.
We used the 1994 electoral reform in Japan that conducted drastic reap-
portionment as a natural experiment.6 The reform applied to the election
system of the House of Representatives (Lower House), while the electoral
system for the House of Councilors (Upper House) stayed constant. Before
the reform, all 500 members of the House of Representatives were elected
by a single, non-transferable vote system with multi-member districts. After
the reform, 300 members were elected by the single-member district (SMD)
plurality rule, and another 200 members were elected by the proportional
representation (PR) system. For the SMD part, a single seat is allocated to
each of the 47 prefecture and the rest are allocated according to the size of
the prefecture population. For the PR part, seats are allocated to 11 blocks
proportional to the population of each bloc. The first Lower House election
after the reapportionment occurred in October 1996.
The change of seat allocations across prefectures is tabulated in Table 1.
6For details of the electoral reform, see Christensen (1994), Christensen (1996), Chris-
tensen (1998) and Horiuchi and Saito (2003)
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The first column tabulates the number of seats assigned for each prefecture
before the electoral reform. The second column tabulates the number of
seats assigned for the SMDs after the reform. The third column tabulates
the estimated number of seats elected by the PR system after the reform.
Seats for the PR system are allocated for 11 blocs, so we allocated the seats
assigned to each bloc using the weight that is proportional to the number of
voters for each prefecture. The fourth column tabulates the total number of
seats allocated to each prefecture, which is the sum of the third and fourth
columns. A striking finding is that the total number of seats allocated to each
prefecture did not change much due to the electoral reform, as indicated
by the first and fourth columns. However, the number of seats that are
directly elected by voters changed drastically, due to the electoral reform, as
evidenced by comparing the first and the second columns.
In our analysis, we focus on the change in the number of seats that are di-
rectly elected by politicians’ names. This is because those politicians who are
elected by their names in their respective electoral districts presumably have
a stronger incentive to do pork-barrel politics. In addition, it is widely be-
lieved that those Lower House members elected from the SMD have stronger
political influence than those who are elected by the PR system. Reflecting
this widely shared view, those Lower House members who are elected from
the SMD are called Gold members, while those who are elected from the
PR system are called Silver members (Asahi Shinbun (2000) and Yomiuri
Shinbun (2000)).
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The large change in the number of Lower House members who are directly
elected by their names by prefectures presumably created a large variation
in the public capital allocation.
3 Empirical Model
We estimated the standard prefecture-level Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion:
ln yit = β0 + β1 ln lit + β2 ln kit + β3 ln git + yearβ4 + ci + uit, (1)
where yit is the gross prefecture domestic product, lit is the total hours
worked defined by person-hour, kit is the service flow of private capital,
and git is the service flow from government capital stock, year is the set
of year dummy variables, i is the subscript for prefecture, and t is the sub-
script for year. The error term consists of time-invariant prefecture effects
ci and idiosyncratic shock to production uit. If the prefecture effects are not
correlated with explanatory variables, (i.e. E(ci|li, ki, gi, year) = 0, where
xi ≡ [xi1, xi2, ..., xiT ]), and the idiosyncratic error term is strictly exogenous
(i.e. E(uit|li, ki, gi, year, ci) = 0), then the OLS estimation renders a consis-
tent estimator.
The first assumption, E(ci|li, ki, gi, year) = 0, is often refuted in empirical
studies because those regions with high output levels tend to have high levels
of public capital stock through local government budgetary constraints in the
US. This assumption is also likely to be violated in Japan because the central
9
government tends to allocate public capital to the permanently stagnating
regions in order to attain “balanced growth.” Reflecting the difference in
the source of the endogeneity of public capital, the OLS estimates are larger
than the fixed effects estimates in the US (Holz-Eakin (1994) and Evans
and Karras (1994)), but the OLS estimates are smaller than the fixed effects
estimates in Japan (Asako, Tsuneki, Fukuda, Teruyama, Tsukamoto, and
Sugiura (1994) and Yamano and Ohkawara (2000)).
The second assumption, E(uit|li, ki, gi, ci, year) = 0, may also be violated,
although this has not often been pointed out in previous studies. To articu-
late this point, we assume that the public capital of prefecture i in year t is
determined as:
ln git = δ0 + δ1 ln lit + δ2 ln kit + δ3 ln yit + zitγ + yearβ4 + αci + vit, (2)
where z is the vector of instrumental variables that determines the public cap-
ital stock, but does not directly determine the output level after conditioning
on ci (i.e. E(uit|li, ki, zi, ci, year) = 0). If α 6= 0 then E(ci|li, ki, gi, year) = 0
is violated because the unobserved heterogeneity that determines prefec-
tures’ output also determines the level of public capital. If δ3 6= 0 then
E(uit|li, ki, gi, ci, year) = 0 is violated because the current shock to produc-
tion affects the current level of public capital. The coefficient δ3 is expected
to be positive if the public capital investment in region i at year t is limited
by the tax revenue in the same region at the same time. However, if the cen-
tral government heavily invests in the stagnating regions, δ3 is expected to
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be negative. Under the condition, δ3 6= 0, the productivity of public capital,
which is β3 in (1), is identified only if the instrumental variables exist for
public capital; i.e. γ 6= 0 in (2). The cross-sectional, instrumental variable
estimator is consistent if the instrumental variable is exogenous from pre-
fecture heterogeneity, E(ci|li, ki, zi, year) = 0, and strictly exogenous from
idiosyncratic shock, E(uit|li, ki, zi, ci, year) = 0. The fixed effects instru-
mental variable estimator is consistent if E(uit|li, ki, zi, ci, year) = 0. This
implies that we can obtain a consistent estimator even when uit and git are
correlated, as far as uit and zit are not correlated conditional on li, ki, ci.
The number of Lower House members who are elected by their names
who represent prefecture i in year t is used as the instrumental variable for
public capital stock in the corresponding prefecture and year. Because we
do not have theoretical guidance of functional form to relate the number
of directly elected members and the log of public capital, we tried several
specifications and decided to directly include the number of members who
are elected by their names as zit in (2).
7 The reduction of the total number
of directly elected Lower House members in 1996 might have changed the
total amount of public capital allocation, but this effect is captured by the
year dummies.
7Note that this functional form issue is not very important because this is an auxiliary
regression function to attain an instrumental variable estimation of the equation (1).
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4 Data
We used the aggregate data of 47 prefectures between 1994 and 1998. These
years were chosen in order to include data before and after the electoral
reform. The first Lower House election after the electoral reform took place in
October 1996, and the last election before the reform took place in June 1993.
The effect of reapportionment on public capital allocation presumably started
to appear in fiscal year 1997. Thus, we have three years of observations before
the reform and two years of observations after the reform. We used gross
prefecture product (y) as the measure of prefectural value-added product.
These data were taken from Cabinet Office (Each Year). As for person-hour
labor input (l), we multiplied the average number of work hours and the
number of regular workers taken from Ministry of Labor (Each Year).8 The
private and public capital stock amounts were taken from Doi (2002). These
stock data include the amounts at the end of fiscal year, and the effects of
the privatization of the telephone, tobacco, and railway public companies
(Dendenkosya, Senbaikosya, and Nihon Kokuyu Tetsudo) and the 1995 Kobe
earthquake are adjusted. The number of seats in the Lower House was taken
from Ministry of Home Affairs (Each Year), which reported the number of
seats for each election year. This is the number of seats elected from the
multiple- member districts before the reform and from the single-member
districts after the reform. Because Lower House members who occupied
8Regular workers (Jo¯yo¯ Ro¯do¯sha) include all those who work without fixed-term con-
tracts. This definition includes both part- and full-time workers.
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seats in year t exercised their political influence on the budget plan for the
fiscal year of t + 1, the number of seats in year t − 1 is used to explain the
public capital amount if year t. As we discuss later, controlling for the capital
utilization rate is important, and we used the annual electric power bought
by large- scale buyers reported in Federation of Electric Power Companies of
Japan (Each Year). Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the data.
Figures 1 and 2 implement a “visual” IV estimation. Figure 1 plots the
relationship between the log of stock amount of public capital and the lagged
number of directly elected members in the House of Representatives, after
adjusting for the log of total hours worked, log capital, and year effects.
This figure shows that the number of seats in the House of Representatives
positively affects the stock amount of public capital. Figure 2 plots the
relationship between the regression-adjusted log output and the regression-
adjusted lagged number of seats. This figure indicates that the number of
seats positively affects the prefectural output. If the number of seats allocated
to each prefecture affects production only through public capital provision,
then the productivity of public capital is the ratio of the slope coefficient of
Figure 2 and the slope coefficient of Figure 1.
5 Results
Table 3 reports the regression results on the determination of public capi-
tal allocation across prefectures. In addition to the number of seats in the
Lower House, the specification includes all the other exogenous explanatory
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variables in the second-stage regression. Column (1) reports the result of the
OLS regression, and it indicates that 10 seat increase in the directly elected
seats in the Lower House results in about a 20 percent increase in public
capital allocation. Column (2) reports the fixed effects result. This result in-
dicates that ten-seat increase in the Lower House increases the public capital
allocation by about 3 percent. This huge drop in the coefficient’s magnitude
implies that the unobserved prefectural heterogeneity that positively affects
public capital allocation is negatively correlated with the number of Lower
House seats. This is not surprising because a large prefecture, in terms of
either area or population, attracts more public capital and has more seats in
the Lower House, even after controlling for labor and capital inputs. In both
the OLS and fixed effects, the number of seats explains the allocation of pub-
lic capital across prefectures, and this evidence is consistent with the previous
finding by Horiuchi and Saito (2003). This finding assures that having seats
in the Lower House works as a good instrument for public capital allocation,
in that it affects prefectural production only through this allocation.
Table 4 tabulates the estimation results of the prefectural production
function that includes public capital, private capital, and employee-hours as
inputs. Column (1) reports the OLS regression result. In this specification,
prefecture public capital does not significantly explain prefecture production,
but the coefficient for labor is 0.60 and the coefficient for capital is 0.42, which
are standard values in the estimation of the production function.9 The coeffi-
9It should be noted that the estimated coefficient for inputs could be biased if the input
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cient for public capital changes significantly once the possible endogeneity of
public capital is taken care of by an IV estimation, whose result is reported
in Column (2). The result of the IV estimation that uses the lagged num-
ber of directly elected seats in the Lower House indicates that a one percent
increase in public capital increases the output by 18 percent, but this effect
is not precisely estimated, as indicated by the large standard error. The co-
efficient for labor input was reduced from the OLS estimate of 0.60 to 0.45
because the public capital amount and the labor input are positively corre-
lated, and the downward bias for the public capital coefficient was canceled
by the upward bias for the labor coefficient. If we take this change in the
coefficient seriously, it implies that the unobserved prefecture production het-
erogeneity and the stock amount of public capital are negatively correlated.
This result is consistent with those of previous studies that have pointed out
that public capital is strategically allocated to Japan’s poorer prefectures. If
only the variation in public capital that is explained by the variation in seat
allocation is used for the estimation, the estimate points to public capital’s
positive contribution to production.
Another strategy to deal with the possible endogeneity of public capital
is to use a fixed effects estimation that allows for the correlation of time-
constant prefecture heterogeneity and explanatory variables, including public
capital. The result of the estimation appears in Column (3). The estimated
amount responds to the regional-level, unobserved technological shock that is not captured
by the year dummies.
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coefficient for public capital is 0.15 with a standard error of 0.15. Although
this estimate is not precise, this again suggests that the OLS estimate, which
was 0.01, was downward biased. This significant change in the estimates
suggests a negative correlation between the time-constant, unobserved pre-
fecture heterogeneity and public capital. This finding is consistent with the
finding in the IV estimate, and this is probably because public capital invest-
ment is distributed toward the poorer prefectures. The coefficients for labor
and private capital inputs are both insignificant; this is probably because of
measurement errors in these inputs, and thus the attenuation bias becomes
serious in the fixed effects estimation. The results of the fixed effects IV
estimation appears in Column (4). In this estimation, the change in public
capital allocation due to the change in the Lower House seat allocation is
used to identify the productivity effect of public capital. In this estimation,
the coefficient for public capital jumps very significantly, but this estimate is
not reliable, as the large standard error indicates. The estimated coefficient
for public capital is not precise because the variation in the change in public
capital due to the change in the number of seats in the Lower House is not
large.
Overall, we take the cross-sectional instrumental variable estimates as
our preferable estimate because this estimate resolves the endogeneity issue
and the size of coefficients for labor and private capital are sensible. The
fixed effects estimates seem to suffer from an attenuation bias due to possible
measurement errors in the input variables. Although the coefficient for public
16
capital was not precisely estimated in the IV estimation, the result suggests
that the OLS estimates are downward biased.
6 Discussion
6.1 Productivity or Keynesian Effect?
The discussion so far has assumed that public capital contributes to the
prefecture production as an input; however, the traditional Keynesian argu-
ment claims that public capital investment stimulates the effective demand
and increases production through mobilizing the unemployed resources. The
pure productivity effect of public capital on production can be estimated
by accurately capturing the level of private inputs because the Keynesian
effect operates through a change in the utilization of private inputs. Thus,
by controlling for the level of private inputs, we can rule out the Keynesian
effect. However, as is commonly discussed in macroeconomics, measuring the
service flow from capital is very difficult. If the utilization of capital is not
appropriately measured, and a high capital utilization is induced by public
capital investment, then the Keynesian effect is captured as the productivity
of public capital. The above discussion is illustrated by using the follow-
ing production function, which incorporates the utilization rate of private
capital:
ln yit = β0 + β1 ln lit + β2 ln(aitkit) + β3 ln git + yearβ4 + ci + uit, (3)
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where ait is the utilization rate of capital that takes values between 0 and 1,
but this utilization rate is not observed by us. Treating the ait as a part of
the error term, the estimation equation becomes
ln yit = β0 + β1 ln lit + β2 ln kit + β3 ln git + yearβ4 + β2 ln ait + ci + uit. (4)
If the increase in git is positively correlated with ait through the Keynesian
effect, the OLS estimator of β3, which attempts to capture the productivity
effect of public capital, is upward biased, given β2 > 0. To reduce this
bias, we use the variation in electricity usage to capture the varying capital
utilization rate, as in Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (1996). We assume
that the utilization rate of capital stock is proportional to electricity usage
as:
ln(ait) = γ ln(mit) + vit, (5)
where ait is the utilization rate of capital stock, mit is electricity usage, and
vit is an error term that is strictly exogenous from all explanatory variables
in (4) and mit. By substituting this relationship into (3), we obtain:
ln yit = β0+β1 ln lit+β2 ln kit+β3 ln git+β2γ lnmit+yearβ4+ci+vit+uit. (6)
This model is estimated by OLS, IV, fixed effects, and IV fixed effects pro-
cedures, as in the previous model. The results of the first-stage estimation
appear in Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3. The results indicate that the
number of seats in the Lower House is the valid instrument, as it enters the
regression significantly, even after controlling for electricity usage. The re-
sults of the second- stage regression appear in Columns (5) through (8) in
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Table 4. The results of the second-stage estimation did not change signif-
icantly. The coefficients for private capital have changed slightly from the
results in Columns (1) through (4), but the coefficients for public capital
have not changed much at all. This implies that the utilization of electricity
is not correlated with public capital stock, and the estimated effect of public
capital on production is not through the stimulation of effective demand, as
Keynesians typically presume. Overall, the analysis that attempts to control
for the capital utilization rate by using electricity usage indicates that an in-
crease in public capital increases production through enhancing productivity
rather than stimulating effective demand.
6.2 The Effect of a Large-scale Earthquake
The Kansai area was hit by a large-scale earthquake, called the Hanshin-
Awaji earthquake, on January 17, 1995. The Hyogo prefecture suffered most
severely from the earthquake.10 Although the data used in this study adjust
for the damage on private and public capital, if this earthquake had a nega-
tive impact on production that was not captured by the reduced amount of
input reduction, then the productivity effect of public capital can be under-
estimated because the Hyogo prefecture received a relatively large amount
of public capital investment for its infrastructure recovery. To address this
possibility, we implemented the same estimation with a sample that does not
include the Hyogo prefecture.
10See Doi (2002) for the extent of the damage.
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The result of the first-stage regression appears in Columns (5) through
(8) in Table 3. The result of the estimation does not change drastically from
the results that used all of the prefectures as a sample, which are reported in
Columns (1) through (4) in the same table. Even after excluding the Hyogo
prefecture, the number of directly elected seats in the Lower House did affect
the amount of public capital formation.
Given this valid instrument, the estimation of the production function
was implemented, treating the public capital amount as an endogenous vari-
able without the Hyogo prefecture. The estimation results of the production
function appear in Table 5. The results of the estimation are virtually the
same as the results without the Hyogo prefecture that are reported in Table
4. The OLS estimates indicate that the productivity of public capital is near
zero. However, once the possible endogeneity of public capital is controlled
for by IV or FE methods, the elasticity of public capital on production is
about 0.2, although the effects are not very precisely estimated. The FEIV
results indicate the very high productivity of public capital, but the standard
errors are too large to make something out of these results. We consider the
cross-sectional IV estimates and panel FE estimates as preferable results and
infer the elasticity of public capital on production to be about 0.2.
7 Conclusion
This paper has estimated the productivity of public capital using the 1994
electoral reform in Japan as a source of exogenous variation of public capital
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allocation across regions. The estimation of public capital productivity is
very difficult because the public capital amount is endogenous. The 1994
electoral reform in Japan drastically increased the political representation of
rural area and increased the allocation of public capital to rural area due to
pork-barrel politics. We exploited this exogenous variation of public capital
to estimate its productivity. The OLS estimates that neglect the endogene-
ity of public capital are downward biased because public capital is allocated
more heavily to stagnating regions. The IV estimates using the number of
seats allocated to each prefecture as the instrument indicate that public cap-
ital is moderately productive. The estimated elasticity of public capital on
production is about 0.2, although the effects are not precisely estimated.
The fixed effects estimation that allows for the correlated heterogeneity with
public capital turned out to be imprecise because the effect from the mea-
surement errors in public and private capital was exacerbated in the fixed
effects estimation.
Contrary to the widely held belief among the general public and the me-
dia that public capital in Japan is not productive, our estimates indicate that
public capital is still moderately productive. Public opinion may be subject
to the same sort of bias associated with cross-sectional OLS estimators. Be-
cause public capital is more heavily allocated to rural areas where economies
are stagnant, people may misperceive that public capital is not productive.
However, our IV estimates indicated that rural economies might have been
even more stagnant if they had not received public capital. Our results cau-
21
tion that future policy discussions on public capital provisions should be
based on the estimation results that pay extra attention to the endogeneity
of public capital allocation.
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Table 1: Number of seats in the House of Representative before and after the 1994 
Electoral Reform 
The first election after the reform took place in October 1996. 
Period  Before the Reform 
1995 
After the Reform 
1996 
Electoral 
System 
 Single 
non-transferable vote 
system with 
multi-member district.
(Chusenkyo-ku) 
Single-member 
district (SMD) 
plurality rule 
(Shosenkyo-ku)
Proportionally 
Representative 
(PR) System 
(Estimates) 
(Hirei Daihyo) 
 
Total 
Prefecture      
Hokkaido  23 13 8 21 
Aomori  7 4 2 6 
Iwate  7 4 2 6 
Miyagi  8 6 3 9 
Akita  7 3 2 5 
Yamagata  7 4 2 6 
Fukushima  12 5 3 8 
Ibaragi  12 7 3 10 
Tochigi  10 5 6 11 
Gunma  10 5 6 11 
Saitama  20 14 6 20 
Chiba  19 12 5 17 
Tokyo  43 25 17 42 
Kanagawa  22 17 7 24 
Niigata  13 6 5 11 
Toyama  6 3 2 5 
Ishikawa  5 3 2 5 
Fukui  4 3 2 5 
Yamanashi  5 3 2 5 
Nagano  12 5 6 11 
Gifu  9 5 3 8 
Shizuoka  14 9 5 14 
Aichi  22 15 10 25 
Mie  8 5 3 8 
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Shiga  5 3 2 5 
Kyoto  10 6 4 10 
Osaka  28 19 13 32 
Hyogo  19 12 8 20 
Nara  5 4 2 6 
Wakayama  5 3 2 5 
Tottori  4 2 1 3 
Shimane  5 3 1 4 
Okayama  10 5 3 8 
Hiroshima  13 7 4 11 
Yamaguchi  9 4 2 6 
Tokushima  5 3 1 4 
Kagawa  6 3 2 5 
Ehime  9 4 2 6 
Kochi  5 3 1 4 
Fukuoka  20 11 7 18 
Saga  5 3 1 4 
Nagasaki  9 4 2 6 
Kumamoto  9 5 3 8 
Oita  6 4 2 6 
Miyazaki  5 3 2 5 
Kagoshima  9 5 2 7 
Okinawa  5 3 2 5 
Note: After the electoral reform, 200 members of the Lower House were elected by the 
proportionally representative system from 11 blocks. We allocated these seats to 
prefectures proportionally, to the number of voters in each prefecture that consists of a 
block. Because of rounding, the total number of PR seats does not add up to 200. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Sample: All 47 prefectures between 1994 and 1998. 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum
Output (Million Yen) 10182.9 13011.7 1928.6 80600.9 
Annual Employee Hours (Million 
Hours) 
1571.52 1962.32 327.7 12219.9 
Private Capital Stock (Million Yen) 19474.2 24243.5 3164.5 159204.0 
Public Capital Stock (Million Yen) 14353.2 12283.9 4221.7 68100.0 
Electric Power (Million KWh) 5498.9 5287.9 603.0 25876.0 
Seats in Lower House Directly Elected 8.2 6.5 2.0 43.0 
Note: N=235. Output and public capital stock are denominated in the 1990 price. 
Capital stock is denominated in the 1990 price. Employment indicates the number of 
regular workers, including both full- and part-time workers. 
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Table 3: The D
eterm
ination of Public C
apital A
ssignm
ent across Prefectures 
Sam
ple: A
ll 47 prefectures betw
een 1994 and 1998. 
D
ependent Variable: log (Public C
apital) 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
M
odel 
O
LS 
Fixed 
Effects 
O
LS 
Fixed 
Effects 
O
LS 
Fixed 
Effects 
O
LS 
Fixed 
Effects 
Sam
ple 
47 prefectures 
W
ithout H
yogo 
Seats in Low
er H
ouse D
irectly  
0.20 
0.03 
0.20 
0.03 
0.20 
0.03 
0.20 
0.03 
Elected (10 seats)  (t-1)  
(0.11) 
(0.01) 
(0.11) 
(0.01) 
(0.11) 
(0.01) 
(0.11) 
(0.01) 
Log (Em
ployee H
ours) 
0.74 
0.09 
0.73 
0.09 
0.78 
0.08 
0.78 
0.08 
 
(0.27) 
(0.08) 
(0.27) 
(0.08) 
(0.27) 
(0.08) 
(0.27) 
(0.08) 
Log (C
apital) 
-0.13 
0.12 
-0.12 
0.12 
-0.18 
0.11 
-0.18 
0.11 
 
(0.24) 
(0.12) 
(0.25) 
(0.12) 
(0.24) 
(0.12) 
(0.24) 
(0.12) 
Log (Electric Pow
er) 
- 
- 
-0.01 
0.00 
- 
- 
0.00 
0.00 
 
 
 
(0.03) 
(0.01) 
 
 
(0.03) 
(0.01) 
Partial R
2 for Instrum
ent 
0.006 
- 
0.006 
- 
0.007 
- 
0.007 
- 
N
 
235 
235 
235 
235 
230 
230 
230 
230 
R
2 
0.92 
- 
0.92 
- 
0.92 
- 
0.92 
- 
N
ote: Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors for the O
LS estim
ation are robust against panel clustering.  
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Table 4: The Prefecture-level Production Function 
Sam
ple: A
ll 47 prefectures betw
een 1994 and 1998 
D
ependent Variable: log (O
utput) 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
M
odel 
O
LS 
IV
 
FE 
FEIV
 
O
LS 
IV
 
FE 
FEIV
 
Instrum
ent 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
Log (Public C
apital) 
0.01 
0.18 
0.15 
0.64 
0.01 
0.20 
0.15 
0.63 
 
(0.06) 
(0.16) 
(0.15) 
(0.51) 
(0.05) 
(0.15) 
(0.15) 
(0.52) 
Log (Em
ployee H
ours) 
0.60 
0.45 
0.04 
0.03 
0.61 
0.45 
0.04 
0.03 
 
(0.10) 
(0.17) 
(0.10) 
(0.11) 
(0.10) 
(0.17) 
(0.10) 
(0.11) 
Log (C
apital) 
0.42 
0.45 
-0.10 
-0.16 
0.39 
0.42 
-0.11 
-0.16 
 
(0.08) 
(0.09) 
(0.24) 
(0.26) 
(0.08) 
(0.09) 
(0.24) 
(0.26) 
Log (Electric Pow
er) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
(0.02) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
N
 
235 
235 
235 
235 
235 
235 
235 
235 
R
2 
0.99 
0.99 
- 
- 
0.99 
0.99 
- 
- 
N
ote: The sam
e note applies as in Table 3. 
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Table 5: The Prefecture-level Production Function 
Sam
ple: A
ll Prefectures except for H
yogo betw
een 1994 and 1998 
D
ependent Variable: log (O
utput) 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
M
odel 
O
LS 
IV
 
FE 
FEIV
 
O
LS 
IV
 
FE 
FEIV
 
Instrum
ent 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
- 
Lagged 
Seats 
Log (Public C
apital) 
-0.00 
0.17 
0.22 
0.51 
-0.00 
0.19 
0.22 
0.51 
 
(0.06) 
(0.16) 
(0.14) 
(0.40) 
(0.06) 
(0.15) 
(0.14) 
(0.40) 
Log (Em
ployee H
ours) 
0.62 
0.45 
0.05 
0.05 
0.64 
0.46 
0.05 
0.05 
 
(0.11) 
(0.17) 
(0.10) 
(0.10) 
(0.11) 
(0.17) 
(0.10) 
(0.10) 
Log (C
apital) 
0.41 
0.44 
-0.10 
-0.13 
0.37 
0.41 
-0.10 
-0.13 
 
(0.09) 
(0.09) 
(0.24) 
(0.25) 
(0.09) 
(0.09) 
(0.24) 
(0.25) 
Log (Electric Pow
er) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
(0.02) 
(0.02) 
(0.01) 
(0.01) 
N
 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
230 
R
2 
0.99 
0.99 
0.68 
0.67 
0.99 
0.99 
0.68 
0.67 
N
ote: The sam
e note applies as in Table 3. 
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Figure 1: Log (Public Capital) and Lagged Number of Seats 
 
Figure 2: Log (Output) and Lagged Number of Seats 
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